C3
IN FILE
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
1
Amazon.com: An Empire Stretching from Cardboard Box to
Kindle to Cloud1
a draft chapter provided for comment. Will eventually be included in the Summer 2013 version of the award-winning
& low-cost textbook “Information Systems: A Manager’s Guide to Harnessing Technology”.
© Copyright 2013, John M. Gallaugher, Ph.D. – for more info see: http://www.gallaugher.com/
Draft
version
last
modified:
May
3,
2013
–
comments
welcome
[email protected]
INTRODUCTION:
LEARNING
OBJECTIVES:
After
studying
this
section
you
should
be
able
to:
1. Appreciate
the
breadth
of
businesses
that
Amazon
competes
in.
2. Understand
that
Amazon’s
financial
performance
has
not
been
consistent.
3. Begin
to
recognize
the
reasons
for
this
performance
inconsistency
and
set
the
stage
for
the
examination
unfolding
in
subsequent
sections.
As
CEO
of
tech
industry
research
firm
Forrester
Research,
George
Colony
is
paid
to
predict
the
future.
Firms
spend
big
bucks
for
Forrester
reports
that
cover
trends
and
insight
across
the
world
of
computing.
So
when
Colony
turned
his
attention
to
Amazon.com,
the
Internet
retailer
founded
by
Jeff
Bezos,
there
were
a
lot
of
people
paying
attention.
Colony
proclaimed
that
the
recently
public
firm
would
soon
be
“Amazon.toast”
as
larger
traditional
retailers
arrived
to
compete
online.1
Colony
wasn’t
the
only
Bezos-‐basher.
Fortune,
The
Guardian,
and
Barron’s
were
among
the
publications
to
have
labeled
the
firm
“Amazon.bomb”.
Bezos’
personal
favorite
came
from
a
pundit
who
suggested
the
firm
should
be
renamed
“Amazon.org”
adopting
the
domain
of
a
non-‐profit
since
it’ll
never
make
any
money2.
Amazon
went
seven
whole
years
without
turning
a
profit,
losing
over
$3
billion
during
that
time.
The
firm’s
stock
price
had
fallen
from
a
high
of
$100
a
share
to
below
$6.
Conventional
wisdom
suggested
that
struggling
dot-‐coms
were
doomed
as
retail
giants
were
poised
to
bring
their
strong
off-‐line
brands
and
logistics
prowess
to
the
Internet,
establishing
themselves
as
multi-‐channel
dominators
standing
athwart
the
bloodied
remains
of
the
foolish
early-‐movers.
But
during
those
seven
years
and
through
to
this
day,
Bezos
(pronounced
BAY-‐zose)
steadfastly
refused
to
concentrate
on
the
quarterly
results
Wall
Street
frets
over.
Instead,
the
Amazon
founder
has
followed
his
best
reckoning
on
where
markets
and
technology
were
headed,
postponing
profit
harvesting
while
expanding
warehousing
capacity,
building
e-‐commerce
operations
worldwide,
growing
one
of
the
net’s
most
widely-‐used
cloud
computing
platforms,
leading
the
pack
in
eBook
readers,
and
developing
the
first
credible
threat
to
Apple’s
dominant
iPad
in
tablets.
1
Faculty:
I’ll
post
my
personal
slides
online
at
gallaugher.com,
but
there
is
also
a
wonderful
deck
by
FaberNovel
that
covers
much
of
the
content
in
this
case.
You
can
find
it
at:
http://www.fabernovel.com/en/works/97-‐amazon-‐com-‐the-‐hidden-‐empire
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
2
Tellingly,
Amazon’s
first
profit
was
posted
the
week
one-‐time
brick-‐and-‐mortar
goliath
Kmart
went
bankrupt.
Kmart
was
also
the
former
parent
of
another
giant
of
the
offline
world,
Borders,
a
firm
that
completely
shuttered
in
the
wake
of
Amazon’s
dominance.
And
for
Amazon,
profits
continued.
In
a
three-‐year
period
following
the
introduction
of
the
Kindle,
Amazon’s
net
income
climbed
from
$476
million
to
$1.15
billion.
Barnes
&
Noble’s
fell
from
$150
million
to
$37
million
before
dipping
into
the
red.
Punditry
is
a
dangerous
business,
but
Barron’s
made
up
for
the
dot-‐bomb
comment,
putting
Amazon
on
its
cover
under
a
headline
proclaiming
the
firm
the
world’s
best
retailer.
Fortune
atoned
by
naming
Bezos
the
“Businessperson
of
the
Year”3.
Amazon’s
future
continues
to
be
hotly
debated
as
the
firm’s
profitability
swings
wildly.
Massive
investments
crushed
Amazon
profits
in
2012,
with
the
firm
dipping
$39
million
into
the
red.
Yet
stock
performance
during
this
period
suggests
Wall
Street
expects
a
huge
upside.
And
Amazon
was
recently
named
as
having
the
“Best
Reputation
of
any
US
corporation.”4
So
is
Amazon
the
“unstoppable
monster
of
the
tech
industry”
or
a
“charitable
organization
run
by
elements
of
the
investment
community
for
the
benefit
of
customers”5?
Both?
Neither?
SIDEBAR: Jeff Bezos & the Long Term (in his own words and more)
“Our first shareholder letter, in 1997, was entitled, “It’s all about the long term.” If everything you do
needs to work on a three-year time horizon, then you’re competing against a lot of people. But if you’re
willing to invest on a seven-year time horizon, you’re now competing against a fraction of those people,
because very few companies are willing to do that. Just by lengthening the time horizon, you can
engage in endeavors that you could never otherwise pursue. At Amazon we like things to work in five to
seven years. We’re willing to plant seeds, let them grow—and we’re very stubborn. We say we’re
stubborn on vision and flexible on details.”6
Just how far ahead is Bezos’ time horizon? His personal investments include Blue Origin, a commercial
rocketry and aviation firm that intends to send humans into space. Bezos has also built a 10,000 year
clock deep inside a mountain on his ranch in West Texas. The timepiece plays an elaborate cuckoo-
like sequence, composed by musician Brian Eno, to mark every year, decade, century, millennium and
10 millennia. How’s that for a symbol of long-term thinking!7
Why
Study
Amazon.com?
Looking
at
the
Internet’s
largest
retailer
provides
a
context
for
introducing
several
critical
management
concepts
such
as
cash
efficiency
and
channel
conflict.
We
see
ways
in
which
tech-‐fueled
operations
can
yield
above-‐average
profits
far
greater
than
off-‐line
players.
We
can
illustrate
advantages
related
to
scale,
the
data
asset,
and
the
brand-‐building
benefits
of
personalization
and
other
customer
service
enhancements.
Amazon’s
Kindle
business
allows
us
to
look
into
the
importance
of
mobile
computing
as
a
vehicle
for
media
consumption,
a
distribution
channel
for
increased
sales
and
advertising,
a
creator
of
switching
costs,
a
gathering
point
for
powerful
data,
and
in
competition
for
platform
dominance.
And
the
firm’s
AWS
(Amazon
Web
Services)
business
allows
us
to
see
how
the
firm
is
building
a
powerhouse
cloud
provider,
generating
new
competitive
assets
while
engaging
in
competition
where
it
sells
services
to
firms
that
can
also
be
considered
rivals.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
3
KEY
TAKEAWAYS:
• Amazon
is
the
largest
online
retailer,
and
has
expanded
to
dozens
of
categories
beyond
books.
As
much
of
the
firm’s
media
business
(books,
music,
video)
becomes
digital,
the
Kindle
business
is
a
conduit
for
retaining
existing
businesses
and
for
growing
additional
advantages.
And
the
firm’s
AWS
cloud
computing
business
is
one
of
the
largest
players
in
that
category.
• Amazon
takes
a
relatively
long-‐view
with
respect
to
investing
in
initiatives
and
its
commitment
to
grow
profitable
businesses.
The
roughly
seven-‐year
timeline
is
a
difficult
one
for
public
companies
to
maintain
amid
the
pressure
for
consistent
quarterly
profits.
• Amazon’s
profitability
has
varied
widely
and
analysts
continue
to
struggle
to
interpret
the
firm’s
future.
However,
studying
Amazon
will
reveal
important
concepts
and
issues
related
to
business
and
technology.
QUESTIONS
&
EXERCISES:
1. Which
firms
does
Amazon
compete
with?
2. Investigate
Amazon’s
performance
over
the
last
five
years.
How
has
the
firm
done
with
respect
to
revenue,
net
income,
share
price?
How
does
this
compare
with
competitors
you’ve
mentioned
above?
3. What
are
some
of
the
advantages
in
having
a
longer
time
horizon?
What
are
some
of
the
challenges?
What
needs
to
happen
to
enable
Amazon
to
continue
to
‘think
long
term’?
What
could
derail
this
approach?
THE
EMPEROR
OF
E-‐COMMERCE:
LEARNING
OBJECTIVES:
After
studying
this
section
you
should
be
able
to:
1. Recognize
how
Amazon’s
warehouse
technology
and
systems
are
designed
to
quickly
and
cost-‐effectively
get
product
from
suppliers
to
customers
with
a
minimum
of
error.
2. Understand
how
high
inventory
turns
and
longer
accounts
payable
periods
help
fuel
a
negative
cash
conversion
cycle
at
Amazon,
and
why
this
is
a
good
thing.
3. Gain
insight
into
various
advantages
that
result
from
the
firm’s
scale
and
cost
structure.
4. Appreciate
how
data
can
drive
advantages
not
fully
available
to
off-‐line
firms,
ranging
from
increased
personalization
to
innovation
and
service
improvements.
5. Identify
the
two-‐sides
in
Amazon
Marketplace
network
effects,
and
why
this
is
important
in
strengthening
the
firm’s
brand.
6. Appreciate
how
mobile
access
is
influencing
opportunities
through
additional
changes
in
how,
where,
and
when
consumers
shop.
Amazon
got
its
start
selling
books
online.
The
firm’s
first
office
was
in
a
modest
space
boasting
a
then
appealing
400
square
foot
basement
warehouse
in
a
low-‐rent
area
of
Seattle,
where
neighboring
establishments
included
the
local
needle
exchange,
a
pawn
shop,
and
“WigLand.”8
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
4
Today
the
firm
is
decidedly
larger.
Its
ninety
plus
distribution
centers
worldwide
boast
well
over
26
million
square
feet
of
warehouse
space.
9
And
Amazon
is
now
the
world’s
largest
online
retailer
in
dozens
of
categories.
The
stylized
smile
in
the
Amazon
logo
doubles
as
an
arrow
pointing
from
A
to
Z
(as
in
“we
carry
everything
from…”).
A
new
downtown
Seattle
headquarters
will
take
up
three
full
city
blocks
anchored
by
three
signature
office
towers.
How
does
a
firm
that
sells
products
that
pretty
much
any
other
retailer
can
provide,
grow
and
create
competitive
advantages
that
keep
rivals
at
bay?
Look
to
the
napkin
–
Amazon’s
headquarters
lobby
sports
the
framed
vision
scribbled
out
by
Amazon’s
chief
(see
below).
Figure X: Amazon’s “Wheel of Growth”, adapted from a Jeff Bezos napkin scribble (note: publisher needs to
see if permission for use is required/can be obtained – has been widely shown in Amazon Investor Relations
slides & reprinted in the media.
At
the
heart
are
three
pillars
of
Amazon’s
business:
large
selection,
convenience,
and
lower
prices.
Says
Bezos
“I
always
get
the
question,
what’s
going
to
change
in
10
years?
I
almost
never
get
asked,
what’s
NOT
going
to
change
in
the
next
10
years?
That’s
the
more
important
question,
because
you
can
build
a
business
around
things
that
are
stable.
[Things
like]
low
prices…
faster
delivery[offering
customer
convenience].
Vast
selection.”10
The
three
pillars
of
selection,
convenience,
and
low
prices
reinforce
one
another
and
work
together
to
create
several
additional
assets
for
competitive
advantage.
Exceptional
customer
experience
fuels
a
strong
brand
that
makes
Amazon
the
first
place
most
consumers
shop
online.
More
customers
allow
the
firm
to
provide
more
products,
creating
scale.
Amazon
also
opens
its
website
up
to
third-‐party
sellers
–
and
a
dynamic
where
more
customers
attract
more
sellers
which
attract
still
more
customers
(and
so
on).
That
virtuous
cycle
of
buyer-‐seller
growth
is
a
two-‐sided
network
effect,
yet
another
source
of
competitive
advantage.
And
all
this
activity
allows
Bezos
and
Company
to
further
sharpen
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
5
the
business
battle
sword
by
gathering
an
immensely
valuable
data
asset.
Each
digital
movement
is
logged,
and
the
firm
is
constantly
analyzing
what
users
respond
to
in
order
to
further
fine-‐tune
the
customer
experience,
squeeze
out
costs,
and
drive
profits.
Let’s
look
at
each
of
these
items
and
see
how
Amazon’s
bold
tech-‐based
strategy
is
realizing
additional
advantages
in
the
domain
of
marketing,
accounting,
and
operations.
Fulfillment
Operations
–
Driving
Selection,
Customer
Convenience,
and
Low-‐Price
Amazon
has
always
sold
direct
to
consumers,
but
it
didn’t
always
do
this
well.
The
firm’s
early
warehousing
was
a
shambles
of
inefficient,
money-‐burning
processes.
Said
one
analyst,
Amazon’s
“inventory,
and
warehouse
operating
costs,
[were]
so
high
they
made
old-‐fashioned
retailers
look
efficient.”11
The
situation
was
once
so
bad
that
in
order
to
stay
in
business
Amazon
had
to
issue
more
than
$2
billion
in
bonds.
To
fix
the
problem,
Amazon
looked
to
others
for
talent,
hiring
away
both
the
Chief
Information
Officer
(CIO)
and
Chief
Logistics
Officer
from
the
world’s
largest
retailer,
Walmart
(Walmart
sued,
the
two
eventually
settled
out
of
court).
But
raiding
Walmart’s
talent
pool
wasn’t
enough.
Amazon’s
warehouse
and
technology
infrastructure
is
radically
different
than
any
conventional
retailer.
While
Walmart
warehouses
that
support
its
superstores
ship
large
pallets
of
diapers
to
thousands
of
its
retail
locations,
Amazon
warehouses
pick
and
pack
boxes
of
disparate
individual
items,
sending
packages
to
millions
of
homes.
To
build
a
system
that
worked,
Amazon
focused
on
costs,
data,
and
processes
so
that
it
could
figure
out
what
was
wrong
and
how
it
could
improve.
One
effort,
“Get
the
C.R.A.P.
out”
focused
on
products
that
“Can’t
Realize
Any
Profits”.
The
firm’s
Senior
Vice
President
of
North
American
Operations
recalls
visiting
a
Kentucky
warehouse
and
watching
a
staffer
spend
20
minutes
packaging
up
a
folding
chair
–
a
process
way
too
inefficient
for
a
firm
with
razor-‐thin
margins.
To
fix
the
situation,
Amazon
worked
with
the
vendor
to
get
chairs
in
pre-‐packaged,
read-‐to-‐ship
boxes,
keeping
the
product
while
cleaving
costs.12
In
order
to
automate
profit-‐pushing
hyper-‐efficiency,
Amazon
warehouses
are
powered
by
at
least
as
much
code
as
the
firm’s
website13
–
nearly
all
of
it
home-‐grown.14
Technology
lets
a
given
Amazon
warehouse
send
out
over
2
million
packages
a
week
during
the
holiday
season,
all
without
elves
or
flying
reindeer.15
The
firm’s
larger
warehouses
are
upwards
of
a
quarter-‐mile
in
length
and
are
packed
with
shelves
stacked
five
or
more
rows
high.
Technology
choreographs
hundreds
of
workers
in
what
seems
part
symphony,
part
sprint.
When
suppliers
ship
new
products
to
Amazon,
items
are
scanned
and
prepped
for
order
within
hours
of
arrival.
Dozens
of
workers
examine
the
incoming
shipments
for
defects.
If
a
problem
is
spotted
in
the
receiving
area,
the
staffer
flips
an
adjacent
warning
light
from
green
to
red,
signaling
a
warehouse
‘problem
solver’
to
swoop
in,
deal
with
the
issue,
and
make
sure
additional
items
can
keep
on
flowing
in.16
Amazon’s
items
that
produce
the
most
sales
volume
(think
bestselling
books,
Kindles)
aren’t
even
stocked
on
proper
shelves,
instead
pallets
of
goods
are
dropped
in
an
area
called
‘mass
land’
for
fast
pick-‐up
that
doesn’t
require
scurrying
through
a
maze
of
shelves.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
6
Slower-‐moving
items
are
racked
up
by
‘shelvers’,
who
place
items
in
available
spaces.
Shelvers
then
scan
a
unique
shelf
code
for
that
location
so
that
Amazon’s
systems
know
where
an
item
has
been
stocked.
The
same
item
might
be
stored
in
a
dozen
different
places
throughout
the
warehouse,
but
that’s
OK
–
the
system
knows
where
everything
is.
Amazon
has
an
additional
rule
when
stacking
shelves
–
no
two
similar
products
can
sit
next
to
each
other.
While
this
makes
Amazon’s
shelves
look
like
an
unorganized
hodgepodge,
when
a
product
is
the
only
one
of
its
type
in
a
given
area,
this
actually
reduces
the
chances
that
a
picker
will
confuse
a
size
or
color
or
otherwise
grab
the
wrong
thing.17
Reducing
mistakes
keeps
customers
happy
in
brand-‐building
ways,
and
it
reduces
errors
that
can
crush
profits.
Staff
known
as
warehouse
pickers
are
in
charge
of
building
your
order
from
a
warehouse’s
inventory.
Wireless
devices
give
pickers
instructions
on
precisely
where
to
navigate
to
and
what
items
to
grab
within
the
maze
of
numbered
isles
and
shelves.
Pickers
scan
shelf
codes
after
they
get
each
item,
and
the
device
prompts
them
with
their
next
marching
orders.
Warehouse
software
plots
the
picking
path
to
minimize
worker
steps
and
maximize
order
fulfillment
efficiency.18
Another
group
of
‘problem
solvers’
scuttle
about
the
warehouse
with
wheel-‐mounted
laptops,
observing
operations
and
offering
coaching
on
how
staff
can
do
things
better.19
Once
all
items
for
a
given
order
are
picked,
they
are
placed
in
orange
bins
that
travel
along
conveyor
belts
for
packing.
Software
then
tells
‘packing
associates’
the
optimal
size
of
smile-‐logoed
Amazon
cardboard
box
to
use
for
a
given
order.
Packed
boxes
are
weighed
and
the
software
does
an
additional
check
to
see
if
the
weight
is
what’s
expected.
If
an
order
is
too
light
that’s
a
sign
that
a
box
is
missing
an
item.
Systems
only
stamp
names
and
addresses
on
boxes
after
orders
are
complete
and
boxes
are
sealed.
No
floor
workers
know
who
you
are
or
what
you’ve
ordered.
Packed
boxes
are
then
loaded
on
to
separate
trays
that
ride
into
another
conveyor
belt
system,
where
they
are
scanned
and
tipped
down
the
correct
chute
among
dozens
of
choices
so
that
the
box
is
routed
on
to
the
correct
truck
for
that
order’s
shipping
provider
and
destination.
Some
warehouses
ship
products
so
quickly
that
outbound
trucks
are
dispatched
with
a
less-‐than
three
minute
window
between
them.20
To
foster
improvement,
warehouse
movements
are
continuously
logged
and
productivity
is
tracked
and
plotted.
Input
from
warehouse
‘problem
solvers’
is
also
taken
into
account.
Says
one
Amazon
exec
“If
we
discover
a
better
way
of
doing
something,
we
can
roll
it
out
across
the
world
overnight.”
21
Top-‐notch
workers
are
praised
throughout
the
day,
as
management
calls
out
the
names
of
workers
who
hit
or
exceeded
their
goals.”
22
Amazon
often
boasts
on-‐time
package
deliver
rates
of
up
to
99.9%
or
more.
Keeping
customers
happy
stems
in
part
from
setting
expectations,
so
Amazon’s
systems
receive
weather
reports,
as
well.
Order
a
product
during
a
pre-‐Christmas
snowstorm
and
expect
to
see
a
message
on
the
website
indicating
“adverse
weather
conditions
are
impacting
deliveries.”23
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
7
And
Amazon
isn’t
done
with
automation.
It
purchased
Massachusetts-‐based
robotics
firm,
Kiva
Systems
for
over
three
quarters
of
a
billion
dollars.
While
most
Amazon
warehouses
aren’t
yet
set
up
for
full
robotic
automation,
Kiva’s
robots
were
already
being
used
in
the
warehouse
of
Amazon-‐subsidiary
Zappos.
Executives
at
Kiva
say
its
systems
can
pick
200
to
400
items
per
hour.
24
Figure X: A Day in the Life of a Kiva Robot. This YouTube Video shows Kiva robots in action at a massive
warehouse. Publisher will likely need to secure permission to embed video
(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KRjuuEVEZs)
Amazon’s
Cash
Conversion
Cycle
–
Realizing
Financial
Benefits
from
Speed
Quickly
moving
products
out
of
warehouses
is
good
for
customers,
but
Amazon’s
speed
also
offers
another
critical
advantage
over
most
brick
and
mortar
retailers
–
the
firm
is
astonishingly
efficient
at
managing
cash.
Here’s
how.
When
incoming
inventory
shows
up
at
most
retailers
–
and
this
is
certainly
true
for
Amazon,
Barnes
and
Noble,
and
Best
Buy
–
those
firms
don’t
pay
their
suppliers
right
away.
Instead
they
log
payment
due
for
these
goods
as
an
account
payable,
a
bill
that
says
when
payment
is
due
sometime
in
the
future.
Accounts
payable
periods
vary,
but
it’s
not
uncommon
for
a
big
retailer
to
be
able
to
hold
products
for
a
month
or
longer
without
having
to
pay
for
them.
However,
when
customers
buy
from
a
retailer,
they
pay
right
away.
Cash
is
collected
immediately,
and
funds
from
credit
cards
and
checks
clear
in
no
more
than
a
few
days.
The
firm’s
period
between
shelling
out
cash,
and
collecting
funds
associated
with
a
given
operation,
is
referred
to
as
the
cash
conversion
cycle
(CCC).
There
are
other
factors
that
influence
the
CCC,
but
right
now
we’ll
concentrate
on
the
hugely
important
time
difference
between
paying
for
inventory
and
selling
those
goods.
A
retailer
wants
this
number
to
be
as
small
as
possible,
otherwise
unsold
inventory
is
sitting
on
shelves
and
doesn’t
generate
any
cash
until
it’s
sold.
Especially
cash-‐crunched
firms
may
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
8
even
require
short-‐term
loans
to
pay
suppliers,
and
those
firms
that
can’t
generate
cash
quickly
enough
are
referred
to
as
having
liquidity
problems.
While
a
firm’s
cash
conversion
cycle
varies
from
quarter
to
quarter,
Barnes
&
Noble
has
reported
that
its
inventory
has
sat
on
shelves
68
days
on
average
before
being
purchased.25
Best
Buy
has
held
inventory
for
as
much
as
70
days
on
average
before
a
sale26.
Costco
and
Walmart
sell
goods
more
quickly,
but
they
also
pay
for
inventory
before
it
is
sold.27
When
compared
to
these
peers
however,
Amazon
alone
among
them
consistently
reports
a
negative
cash
conversion
cycle
–
it
actually
sells
goods
before
it
has
to
pay
its
suppliers.
This
gives
the
firm
a
special
advantage
since
it
has
an
additional
pool
of
cash
that
it
can
put
to
work
on
things
like
expanding
operations,
making
interest-‐bearing
investments,
and
more.
Figure X: Cash Conversion Cycle (in days) among select major retailers
The
efficiency
of
a
firm’s
cash
cycle
will
vary
over
time.
And
numbers
reported
are
an
average
for
all
products
–
some
products
are
slow
movers,
while
others
are
sold
very
quickly.
But
the
negative
cash
conversion
cycle
is
another
powerful
benefit
that
Amazon’s
fast-‐fulfillment
model
offers
it
over
rivals.
The
goal
for
Amazon:
keep
inventory
turns
high
(e.g.
sell
quickly),
and
pay
suppliers
later.
Internet
Economics,
Scale,
and
Pricing
Power
Selling
more
goods
often
gives
Amazon
bargaining
power
with
suppliers.
And
the
size
(scale)
of
Amazon’s
business
provides
the
firm
with
negotiating
leverage
to
secure
lower
prices
and
longer
payment
terms.
But
Amazon’s
cost-‐structure
for
operations
is
also
superior
to
rivals.
To
be
certain,
Walmart’s
sales
dwarf
Amazon’s.
Walmart’s
2012
sales
figures
were
$446
million.
Amazon’s
$61
million
2012
sales
are
about
the
same
as
Target’s.
But
Walmart
has
10,773
stores
worldwide28.
Target
has
1,778
stores29.
Amazon
has
90-‐
plus
warehouses
total
and
no
conventional
stores.
While
Amazon
spends
significantly
on
software,
automation,
and
expansion
of
its
warehouses,
its
overall
costs
for
things
like
real-‐
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
9
estate,
energy,
inventory,
and
security
will
be
lower
than
brick
and
mortar
rivals.
And
employee
efficiency
should
be
greater
as
well,
since
Amazon
shift
workers
are
working
at
fairly
constant
rates
throughout
the
day,
while
retailer
activity
fluctuates
with
the
ebb
and
flow
of
customer
visitation
hours.
Retail
can
be
a
cut-‐throat
business.
The
exact
same
products
in
one
store
are
often
available
through
competitors,
so
competition
often
boils
down
to
whoever
has
the
lowest
price.
Amazon’s
scale
enables
it
to
operate
with
thin
margins,
giving
it
the
strength
to
sustain
lower
prices.
As
former
Amazon
employee
Eugene
Wei
puts
it,
this
allows
Amazon
to
“to
thin
the
oxygen”
of
competitors.30
Amazon’s
breadth
of
operations
brings
in
cash
from
other
businesses,
in-‐effect
allowing
the
firm
to
“hold
its
breath
longer”
if
challenged
in
an
unprofitable
price
war.
Consider
DVD
Empire’s
reaction
to
the
launch
of
the
Amazon
Video
Store.
DVD
Empire
was,
at
the
time,
the
largest
seller
of
online
video.
Feeling
threatened
by
Amazon’s
arrival,
DVD
Empire
lowered
prices
to
an
unsustainable
50
percent
below
retail.
Amazon
wouldn’t
make
any
money
at
50
percent
off,
either,
but
as
Wei
puts
it
“Our
leading
opponent
had
challenged
us
to
a
game
of
who
can
hold
your
breath
longer”
and
Amazon
had
“bigger
lungs”.
The
lesson
is
clear
–
a
smaller
firm
looking
to
pick
a
price-‐fight
with
Amazon
might
not
survive.
Amazon’s
retail
prices
aren’t
just
cheaper
than
other
e-‐commerce
firms,
they’re
usually
cheaper
than
larger
rival
Walmart,
too.
Wells
Fargo
compared
a
diverse
basket
of
products
available
at
both
firms
and
found
Walmart
prices
were
actually
19
percent
more
expensive
than
Amazon.
Target
was
28
percent
more
expensive,
while
products
purchased
at
specialty
retailers
cost
30
percent
more.
Even
more
impressive,
Amazon
seems
to
be
monitoring
the
availability
of
products
at
competitor
websites
and
using
stock-‐outs
as
an
opportunity
to
earn
more.
The
Wall
Street
Journal
reports
that
“where
rivals
sold
out
of
items,
Amazon
responded
by
raising
its
prices
an
average
of
10
percent.”31
Firms
should
be
careful
–
consumers
have
been
known
to
react
angrily
to
so-‐called
dynamic
pricing
if
they
feel
they
are
taken
advantage
of.32
But
the
insight
does
show
how
data
can
drive
a
nimble
response
to
shifts
in
the
competitive
landscape.
Figure X: Key Retailer Avg. Price Difference Above Amazon.com33
While
not
well
known
for
its
own
brands
beyond
Kindle,
Amazon’s
scale
has
allowed
it
to
create
several
product
lines
that
it
has
branded
itself.
Amazon’s
private-‐label
brands
include
AmazonBasics
(cables,
battaries,
and
other
consumer
electronics
accessories),
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
10
Pizon
(kitchen
gadgets),
Strathwood
(outdoor
furniture),
Pike
Street
(bath
and
home
products),
and
Denali
(tools).34
Putting
its
own
brand
on
high-‐volume
products
should
allow
Amazon
to
cut
out
some
pricing
that
would
otherwise
go
to
a
branded
supplier.
The
willingness
to
sell
its
own
brands
can
also
give
Amazon
even
more
negotiating
leverage
with
suppliers.
Firms
unwilling
to
provide
Amazon
with
the
price
breaks,
payment
terms,
or
complete
product-‐
line
access
it
demands
may
see
Amazon
compete
directly
with
them
via
a
private-‐label
product.
And
a
scale-‐reinforced
brand
that
screams
‘best
price’
in
a
space
crowded
with
me-‐too
retailers
selling
the
exact
same
thing
is
a
powerful
asset
and
enormous
barrier
for
competitors
to
try
to
overcome.
Amazon
can
keep
advertising
spending
down
as
customers
see
the
firm
as
the
first
and
often
only
stop
needed
when
moving
from
product
research
to
purchase.
Consider
that
Target
(with
roughly
the
same
revenues
as
Amazon)
is
a
member
of
that
elite
club
of
firms
that
spends
over
$1
billion
in
advertising
($1.62
billion
in
2011),
while
Amazon
didn’t
even
make
the
list.35
Amazon
also
sees
growth
beyond
consumers.
AmazonSupply
is
billed
as
“The
Store
for
Business
&
Industry”
and
carries
a
range
of
business,
scientific,
and
industrial
goods
for
corporate
customers.
Getting
most
products
in
and
out
of
a
warehouse
is
the
same,
regardless
of
category,
so
Amazon
can
effortlessly
expand
in
any
area
where
it
thinks
the
model
will
work.
Customer
Obsession
For
a
firm
that
does
so
much,
Amazon’s
moves
are
largely
motivated
by
one
thing
–
relentless
customer
focus.
Sure,
every
firm
says
they
care
about
their
customers,
but
consider
this:
in
meetings,
Bezos
is
known
to
insist
that
one
seat
be
left
open
at
the
conference
table
as
a
symbol
representing
‘the
most
important
person
in
the
room’,
the
Amazon
customer.36
To
keep
even
the
most
senior
executives
empathetic
to
the
customer
experience,
every
two
years
every
employee
from
Bezos
on
down
must
spend
two
days
on
the
service
desk
answering
customer
calls.37
It’s
an
eye
on
improving
the
customer
experience
that
has
motivated
so
many
of
Amazon’s
pioneering
efforts,
among
them:
1-‐click
ordering
(which
the
firm
patented),
customer
reviews,
recommendations,
bundles,
look
and
search
inside
the
book,
where’s
my
stuff,
free
supersaver
shipping.
While
pioneered
by
Amazon,
many
of
these
efforts
are
now
accepted
as
must-‐have
features
across
e-‐commerce
categories.38
As
we’ve
mentioned
earlier,
strong
brands
are
built
largely
through
customer
experience.
As
evidence
of
the
strength
of
customer
experience,
Amazon
has
repeatedly
scored
the
highest
rating
on
the
University
of
Michigan’s
American
Customer
Service
Index.
It
was
a
rating
that
not
only
bested
all
other
Internet
retailers,
it
was
the
highest
score
of
any
firm
in
any
service
industry.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
11
Figure X: Letter posted to Amazon’s home page following the firm’s second record-breaking ACSI Index
score (note to publisher: I screen-grabbed this from Amazon’s public website posting years back. I am
assuming it is within copyright to do so. Kindly verify).
Leveraging
the
Data
Asset
–
A/B
Testing,
Personalization,
and
Even
an
Ad
Business
Moving
early
and
having
scale
allows
Amazon
to
amass
that
profoundly
valuable
tech-‐
derived
competitive
resource
–
data.
The
more
customers
a
firm
has,
the
more
accurately
the
firm
can
understand
various
patterns
related
to
recommendations,
preferences,
customer
segments,
price
tolerance,
and
more.
At
Amazon,
data
wins
arguments,
and
the
corporate
culture
gives
employees
the
freedom
to
challenge
even
most
senior
managers
all
the
way
up
to
Bezos
himself..
When
Amazon
coder
Greg
Linden
proposed
that
Amazon
present
‘impulse
buy’
recommendations
that
match
patterns
associated
with
the
consumer’s
shopping
carts
(e.g.
customers
who
bought
that
also
bought
this),
he
was
originally
shot
down
by
a
senior
vice
president.
Linden
was
undeterred,
he
ran
an
A/B
test
-‐
capturing
customer
response
for
those
who
saw
option
“A”
(recommendations)
vs.
option
“B”
(those
who
didn’t).
The
result
overwhelmingly
demonstrated
that
recommendations
would
drive
revenue.39
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
12
SIDEBAR: Two-Pizza Teams: Keeping An Entrepreneurial Culture in a Big Firm
One challenge growing firms often face is they become slow and less innovative as they expand.40 In
order to keep Amazon nimble and innovative, Bezos has mandated a rule known as “two-pizza teams”,
stating that any individual project team should be small enough so that it can be fed by no more than
two pizzas.41 This helps ideas flourish, discourages the kind of ‘groupthink’ that diminishes the
consideration of alternative approaches, and even provides a mechanism where several efforts can
compete to identify the best solution.
While
the
‘abandoned
shopping
cart’
problem
plagues
many
web
retailers,
Amazon
is
considered
one
of
the
best
‘converting’
e-‐commerce
sites,
moving
customers
from
product
evaluation
through
completing
checkout.42
A/B
tests
drive
this
–
the
firm
has
relentlessly
experimented
with
tests
that
modify
and
compare
all
sorts
of
variables
including
the
wording
associated
with
images
and
buttons,
screen
placement,
size,
color,
and
more.
Relentlessly
measuring
customer
activity
also
helps
the
firm
direct
its
investment
in
infrastructure.
One
test,
for
example,
revealed
that
a
tenth
of
a
second’s
delay
in
page
loading
equaled
a
one
percent
drop
in
customer
activity,
pointing
to
a
clear
ROI
for
keeping
server
capacity
scalable.
“43
While
you’re
shopping
on
Amazon,
you’re
likely
part
of
some
sort
of
experiment,
perhaps
several.
While
Amazon
doesn’t
say
how
many
A/B
tests
it
runs,
Google
runs
over
7,000
annually.
Amazon
has
gotten
so
good
at
A/B
testing
that
it
launched
a
service
offering
scalable
options
for
running
simultaneous
tests
and
gathering
measured
results
for
developers
that
use
the
Amazon
app
store.
A/B
testing
is
yet
another
advantage
e-‐
commerce
firms
have
over
conventional
retailers.
Constant
experimentation,
refinement,
and
re-‐testing
is
far
easier
in
the
digital
world
when
every
user’s
click,
delay,
and
back-‐
track
can
be
measured
and
compared.
Amazon’s
data
trove
on
you
individually,
and
users
collectively,
fuels
the
firm’s
personalization
effort
(efficiently
referred
to
internally
as
p13n,
since
there
are
13
letters
between
the
p
and
the
n
in
the
word
‘personalization’).
When
visiting
the
Amazon
home
page
it’s
more
accurate
to
say
that
you’re
visiting
your
Amazon
homepage
at
a
given
point
in
time.
Your
page
may
vary
not
only
based
on
any
ongoing
A/B
tests,
but
also
based
on
Amazon’s
best
guess
of
what
you’ll
want
to
see
as
well
as
any
myriad
of
other
sales
and
promotion
goals.
Behind
the
scenes,
your
web
browser
receives
a
unique
tracking
string
called
a
cookie
and
Amazon
tracks
your
surfing
behavior
as
well
as
your
buying
history.
Rate
products?
Even
better!
Amazon
knows
what
you
liked
and
what
you
didn’t.
The
firm’s
proprietary
collaborative
filtering
software
compares
a
user’s
data
with
that
of
others,
mapping
a
best
guess
of
what
you’ll
like
to
see
each
time
you
visit.
A
parent
who
has
searched
for
and
bought
items
for
young
children
will
likely
see
recommendations
for
other
age-‐appropriate
kid
products
–
maybe
even
guessing
at
your
kids
gender
and
likes.
Athletes,
gamers,
romance
novel
fans
should
also
expect
interest
revealed
by
surfing
and
purchasing
to
create
a
custom
experience.
Scale
means
the
firm
has
more
users
doing
more
things,
allowing
the
firm
to
collect
more
observations
that
fuel
greater
accuracy
in
tailoring
the
user
experience.
And
this
fuels
that
oh-‐so-‐important
brand-‐building
positive
customer
experience.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
13
All
of
this
customer
insight
data
also
positions
Amazon
to
grow
a
massive,
Google-‐
competing
ad
business.
Amazon
initially
sold
ads
as
a
way
to
generate
more
sales
through
its
website,
but
Amazon
now
offers
advertisers
the
ability
to
advertise
on
Kindles,
on
other
Amazon-‐owned
sites
like
IMDb,
within
mobile
apps,
and
via
Amazon-‐targeted
ads
on
third-‐
party
websites.
Amazon
ad
offerings
are
feature-‐rich,
including
things
like
the
ability
to
play
a
movie-‐trailer
in
an
ad,
or
embedding
a
discount
coupon
in
a
click-‐to-‐purchase
offering.
Amazon
reportedly
charges
up
to
$1
million
for
ads
placed
on
the
welcome
screen
of
new
Kindle
Fires.44
Don’t
like
ads?
You
can
pay
$20
more
for
a
Kindle
without
the
‘special
offers’.
Selection
&
Network
Effects
Amazon’s
radical
focus
on
customer
experience
also
caused
it
to
take
what
many
would
consider
a
contrarian
move
–
offering
products
provided
by
others
alongside
its
own
listings.
Third
party
products
are
referred
to
as
being
part
of
the
‘Amazon
Marketplace’.
Amazon
doesn’t
own
inventory
of
marketplace
items.
Sellers
can
warehouse
and
ship
products
themselves,
or
they
can
opt
to
use
Amazon’s
warehouses
as
part
of
the
‘Fulfilled
by
Amazon’
program.
The
latter
lets
Amazon
handle
logistics,
storage,
packaging,
shipping,
and
customer
service,
while
customers
get
Amazon
shipping
prices
–
including
super-‐saver
discounts
and
free
shipping
for
customers
enrolled
in
the
Amazon
Prime
program.
Customers
also
benefit
if
they
already
have
credit
card
and
other
information
on
file
with
Amazon
(a
switching
cost
potentially
deterring
users
from
going
to
a
new
site).
As
much
as
40
percent
of
all
units
sold
by
Amazon
are
from
the
firm’s
2
million
participating
Amazon
Marketplace
sellers
worldwide.45
Marketplace
allows
Amazon
to
build
a
long
tail
of
product
offerings
without
the
costly
risk
of
having
to
take
ownership
of
unproven
or
slow-‐moving
inventory,
while
the
firm
gets
fat
and
happy
in
the
middle
of
a
two-‐sided
network
effect
(i.e.
more
buyers
attract
more
sellers,
and
more
sellers
attract
more
buyers).
Some
Marketplace
products
compete
directly
with
Amazon’s
own
offerings,
but
the
firm
doesn’t
shy
away
from
allowing
competitive
listings,
new
or
used,
even
if
they’re
cheaper.
Competition
among
sellers
reinforces
low-‐price,
and
lowers
the
chance
that
customers
will
look
first
to
sites
like
PriceGrabber,
Shopping.com,
Google
or
eBay.
Even
if
a
rival
wins
a
sale,
all
products
sold
through
Amazon
allow
Bezos’
firm
to
collect
a
fee.
And
when
Amazon
sells
third
party
goods
through
its
site,
it
continues
to
‘own’
much
of
the
customer
relationship
for
that
sale,
gathering
data
that
would
otherwise
be
lost
if
customers
went
elsewhere.
Amazon
also
won’t
hesitate
to
kick
out
sellers
with
bad
ratings
to
ensure
quality
and
protect
the
Amazon
brand.
Not
only
does
Amazon
allow
others
to
sell
products
through
its
site,
it
allows
others
to
market
for
the
firm,
too.
The
Amazon
Associates
program
is
the
world’s
largest
affiliate
marketing
program,
offering
a
sort
of
‘finders
fee’
for
generating
sales.
Website
operators
can
recommend
Amazon
products
on
their
site
and
Amazon
gives
the
affiliate
a
percentage
of
sales
generated
from
these
promotions.
For
Amazon,
fees
paid
are
pay-‐for-‐performance
–
associates
get
a
commissions
only
if
their
promotions
generate
sales.
Fostering
an
Addition
to
Amazon:
Prime,
Mobile,
and
More
Markets
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
14
Amazon
is
also
creating
habit-‐changing
behaviors
that
fuel
sales
growth.
Subscribers
to
Amazon
Prime
get
free
two-‐day
shipping
for
unlimited
qualifying
purchases.
Prime
encourages
impulse
or
on-‐demand
purchases
–
no
need
to
wait
to
aggregate
purchases
for
a
super-‐saver
rate.
The
rise
of
mobile
commerce
also
changes
buying
patterns.
The
cash
register
is
now
in
your
hand,
and
with
you
at
all
times.
Why
create
a
shopping
list
when
you
can
buy
immediately
when
the
need
arises?
Amazon
doesn’t
break
out
mobile
sales,
but
some
analysts
suspect
the
percentage
may
be
as
high
as
10
percent,
and
growing.46
Other
retailers
are
reporting
even
more
impressive
figures.
One
Kings
Lane,
a
firm
bringing
in
over
$200
million
a
year
selling
home
furnishings,
claims
25
percent
of
its
sales
are
from
mobile
devices,
and
that
mobile
shopping
carts
ring
in
an
even
higher
average
order
size
than
orders
from
PCs.47
And
this
is
from
a
firm
that
sells
bulky
items
like
couches
and
chairs!
Acquisition
of
other
firms
and
the
growth
of
new
internal
businesses
has
allowed
Amazon
to
accomplish
several
things
including:
broadening
the
firm’s
product
offerings
to
underscore
Amazon
as
the
‘first
choice’
shopping
destination,
absorbing
potentially
threatening
competitors
before
they
get
too
big,
experimenting
with
new
product
offerings
and
services,
and
integrating
value-‐added
businesses
and
technologies
into
the
Amazon
empire.
BusinessWeek
once
ran
a
cover
story
titled
“What
Amazon
Fears
Most”,
featuring
a
diaper-‐clad
toddler.
The
implication
was
NJ-‐based
Quidsi,
operator
of
diapers.com,
could
grow
brand
and
scale
in
staple
products,
drawing
customers
away
from
Amazon.
Amazon’s
response?
They
bought
the
firm
for
over
half
a
billion
dollars.
Today
the
Quidsi
subsidiary
has
seven
brands
that
can
deliver
a
range
of
goods
from
cosmetics
to
green
cleaning
products,
in
some
cases
within
the
same
day.
While
Amazon
hasn’t
yet
made
the
decision
to
integrate
Quidsi
completely
into
the
Amazon
experience,
they
are
now
full
owners
of
the
biggest
threat
to
grabbing
high-‐growth
markets
that
Amazon
didn’t
dominate.48
Same
thing
with
Zappos,
which
Amazon
paid
nearly
$1
billion
for,
and
which
continues
to
operate
as
a
separate
brand.49
Other
acquired
firms
include
Alexa,
a
web
analytics
and
tools
provider;
Audible,
the
leading
provider
of
digital
audio
books;
GoodReads
and
Shelfari,
social
networking
sites
for
book
readers;
Woot,
a
flash-‐sales
site;
and
LoveFilm,
often
described
as
the
Netflix
of
Europe.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
15
Figure X: Just some of the brands & businesses owned by Amazon.com
Amazon
is
also
growing
its
own
brands
in
new
categories.
Examples
include
MyHabit,
a
fashion
flash-‐sales
site,
competing
with
the
likes
of
Gilt
Groupe
and
Rue
La
La.
Amazon
Instant
Video
offers
streaming
TV
and
movie
titles
for
rental,
purchase,
and
some
included
free
with
an
Amazon
Prime
subscription.
And
Amazon
Fresh
is
a
FreshDirect-‐like
competitor,
offering
same
day
delivery
of
groceries
and
more.
Amazon
has
also
begun
building
warehouses
close
to
major
metropolitan
areas,
a
move
which
many
think
is
targeted
at
growing
same-‐day
delivery
(Walmart,
eBay,
and
even
Google
also
offer
same-‐
day
delivery
services
in
some
areas).
The
move
is
a
departure
for
Amazon,
which
for
years
built
warehouses
in
low-‐population
states
to
avoid
tax
laws
that
require
sales
tax
collection
where
the
firm
has
a
physical
location.50
As
Amazon
gives
in
on
sales
taxes,
it’s
poised
to
launch
an
all-‐out
assault
on
markets
handled
by
local
retailers.
KEY
TAKEAWAYS:
• Amazon’s
sophisticated
fulfillment
operations
speed
products
into
and
out
of
inventory,
reinforcing
brand
strength
through
speed,
selection,
and
low
prices.
• Rapid
inventory
turnover
and
long
payment
terms
enable
Amazon
to
consistently
post
a
negative
cash
conversion
cycle.
The
firm
sells
products
and
collects
money
from
customers
in
most
cases
before
it
has
paid
suppliers
for
these
products.
• The
cost
structure
for
online
retailers
can
be
far
less
than
that
of
offline
counterparts
that
service
similarly-‐sized
markets.
Savings
can
come
from
employee
costs,
inventory,
energy
usage,
land,
and
other
facilities
expenses.
• Amazon’s
scale
is
a
significant
asset.
It
allows
the
firm
to
offer
cheaper
prices
in
many
categories
than
nearly
every
other
firm,
online
or
off.
Scale
gives
Amazon
additional
bargaining
leverage
with
suppliers.
And
the
firm’s
scale-‐driven
low-‐prices
reinforce
Amazon
as
the
‘first
choice’
shopping
destination.
• Amazon’s
ability
to
acquire
and
leverage
data
further
allow
the
firm
to
enhance
customer
experience
and
drive
sales.
Internet
retailers
have
a
greater
ability
to
gather
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
16
personal
data
on
consumers
than
do
offline
counterparts.
Data
is
used
in
personalization
and
in
innovation
fueled
by
the
result
of
A/B
experiments.
• The
rise
of
mobile
is
resulting
in
an
increase
in
shopping
among
many
retailers,
and
fuels
immediate
purchases
rather
than
the
creation
of
shopping
lists.
QUESTIONS
&
EXERCISES:
1. When
you
walk
into
a
conventional
retailer,
similar
items
are
stacked
next
to
each
other.
But
Amazon
tries
not
to
do
this
in
its
warehouses.
Why?
2. How
does
Amazon
warehouse
staff
know
where
to
find
items?
How
does
technology
help
make
the
process
most
efficient?
3. Does
Amazon
buy
most
of
its
warehouse
automation
software
from
others
or
is
most
of
the
software
written
in-‐house?
Why
do
you
suppose
this
is
the
case?
4. In
what
other
ways
do
Amazon’s
information
systems
reduce
errors?
Why
is
error
reduction
so
critical
to
firm
performance?
5. Which
requires
more
code,
the
firm’s
customer
facing
website
or
warehouse
automation?
6. Although
Amazon
is
investing
in
robotics,
human
beings
still
do
most
of
the
product
picking
and
packaging.
How
does
Amazon
ensure
customer
privacy
is
protected,
despite
heavy
human
involvement?
Do
you
think
it
needs
to
go
to
such
great
lengths?
Why
or
why
not?
7. What
is
the
cash
conversion
cycle?
What
factors
enable
Amazon
to
have
a
cash
conversion
cycle
that
is
negative?
Why
are
off-‐line
rivals
unable
to
match
these
efficiencies?
What
advantage
does
this
give
Amazon
over
rivals?
8. How
do
Amazon’s
prices
compare
with
rivals?
What
gives
Amazon
such
advantages?
What
other
pricing
advantages
does
Amazon
have
that
a
conventional
retailer
might
not
be
able
to
take
advantage
of?
9. What
is
dynamic
pricing
and
why
might
this
be
risky?
10. What
are
private-‐label
products
and
what
advantages
do
they
offer
Amazon?
11. Log
into
Amazon
(or
pull
up
a
page
if
you
‘remain’
logged
in).
Compare
it
to
a
classmate’s
page.
What
similarities
do
you
notice?
What
differences?
Why
do
you
think
Amazon
made
the
choice
to
show
you
the
things
that
it
did?
Do
you
think
it
guessed
accurately
regarding
your
interests?
Why
or
why
not?
12. Amazon’s
unique
customer
data
has
allowed
the
firm
to
enter
the
advertising
business.
Which
firms
does
this
bring
Amazon
into
competition
with?
Research
Amazon’s
role
in
matching
advertisers
to
consumers.
How
big
a
player
is
Amazon?
How
do
you
feel
about
a
firm
using
your
personal
data
on
purchases,
product
browsing,
and
recommendations
for
advertising?
Under
what
circumstances
(if
any)
are
you
comfortable
with
such
targeting,
and
under
what
circumstances
are
you
concerned?
13. How
does
Amazon
keep
management
focused
on
customer
issues
and
‘putting
the
customer
first’?
14. Describe
how
Amazon
Marketplace
offers
two-‐sided
network
effects.
15. Besides
network
effects,
what
additional
benefits
does
Amazon
gain
by
allowing
other
retailers
to
sell
potentially
competing
products
on
Amazon?
16. How
does
mobile
change
buying
habits?
Are
retailers
seeing
decreasing
usage
due
to
the
rise
of
mobile
or
more
shopping?
Give
an
example
from
your
reading
or
from
subsequent
research.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
17
17. Amazon’s
operations
are
a
marvel
of
automation
and
procedural
efficiency,
but
the
firm
has
also
been
subject
to
criticism
regarding
its
warehouse
work
environment.
Investigate
these
criticisms
on
your
own.
Do
you
feel
they
are
valid?
Are
any
of
the
critics
also
worthy
of
criticism?
If
so,
how?
Do
you
feel
Amazon
has
responded
appropriately
to
this
criticism?
How
would
you
have
responded
if
you
were
CEO
of
the
firm?
What
take-‐aways
from
your
own
investigation
will
inform
your
own
actions
as
a
manager?
KINDLE
AND
THE
RISE
OF
DIGITAL
LEARNING
OBJECTIVES:
After
studying
this
section
you
should
be
able
to:
• Understand
the
motivation
behind
Amazon’s
Kindle
business.
• Recognize
the
various
ways
that
Amazon
earns
money
and
strengthens
its
competitiveness
via
the
Kindle
platform.
• Examine
the
changes
Amazon’s
digital
media
offerings
have
brought
to
traditional
the
publishing
industry
value
chain.
• Understand
key
concepts
such
as
channel
conflict,
wholesale
pricing,
and
agency
pricing.
While
Amazon
has
built
solid
advantages
by
selling
a
broad
array
of
products,
media
(books,
music,
and
video)
represents
over
1/3
of
the
firm’s
revenue,51
and
nearly
all
of
that
business
is
going
to
shift
from
atoms
to
bits,
shipped
not
in
physical
packaging,
but
through
the
Internet.
Losing
this
market
would
be
a
blow
any
publicly
traded
company,
especially
one
with
razor-‐thin
margins,
would
find
difficult
to
sustain.
This
is
what
has
prompted
the
creation
of
the
Kindle.
While
many
refer
to
Kindle
as
an
e-‐Reader,
Kindle
isn’t
as
much
about
reading
digital
books
as
it
is
about
putting
a
store
in
the
hands
of
the
firm’s
over
150
million
customers52,
allowing
them
to
not
only
lap
up
goods
from
an
increasingly
massive
digital
trough,
but
also
instantly
linking
those
customers
with
the
firm’s
entire
inventory
of
physical
products.
The
Kindle
arrives
linked
to
your
Amazon
account.
That
means
the
device
comes,
out
of
the
box,
as
a
pre-‐configured
cash
register
with
a
vacuum
attached
firmly
to
the
credit
card
in
your
wallet.
The
first
Kindle
was
optimized
for
book
reading
and
featured
a
black
and
white
display
that
used
e-‐Ink.
That
display
can’t
refresh
fast
enough
for
animation
or
video,
but
it
is
legible
in
sunlight
and
only
draws
power
when
flipping
a
dot
from
black
to
white
or
vise
versa,
offering
exceptionally
long
battery
life.
Thanks
to
Moore’s
Law,
Kindles,
originally
offered
at
$399,
grew
in
power
while
plummeting
in
price,
with
a
low-‐end
model
selling
for
just
$69
five
years
after
introduction.
When
introduced,
the
high-‐resolution
color
Kindle
Fire
offered
a
touch-‐screen
tablet
experience
for
half
the
price
of
the
competing
iPad
and
quickly
became
the
second
best
selling
tablet
on
the
market.
The
Kindle
is
also
a
cloud
machine.
The
first
Fire
came
with
half
the
RAM
of
the
iPad,
the
thought
being
that
your
media
would
be
snugly
stored
on
Amazon’s
servers,
downloaded
when
you
need
it.
While
Amazon
doesn’t
promote
this
fact,
the
Fire
is
also
built
on
a
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
18
modified
version
of
Google’s
Android
OS,
allowing
the
tablet
to
run
a
subset
of
native
Android
apps.53
The
success
of
Kindle
is
staggering.
By
the
holiday
season
of
the
product’s
second
year,
the
Kindle
was
Amazon’s
top
selling
product
in
both
dollar
volume
and
unit
sales.54
That
means
Amazon
was
selling
more
Kindles
than
any
single
book,
CD,
movie
title,
toy,
or
any
other
product
among
the
millions
that
it
offers.
Even
more
noteworthy
for
competitors
in
the
eBook
and
tablet
space,
Amazon
doesn’t
look
to
make
money
directly
from
Kindle
hardware
sales
-‐
various
Kindle
versions
are
regularly
sold
at
or
below
costs.55
But
once
that
cash
register
is
in
the
hands
of
consumers,
the
sales
ring
up.
As
an
always-‐on
bookstore,
the
Kindle
works
pretty
well.
Roughly
a
million
titles
are
offered,
with
“search
inside
the
book”
features
and
the
first
chapter
downloadable
for
free.
Estimates
of
the
firm’s
Kindle-‐generated
revenue
bump
vary,
but
all
point
to
positive
Kindle-‐fueled
sales
gains.
RBC
Capital
estimates
that
despite
being
sold
at
a
loss,
each
Kindle
Fire
generates
over
$136
in
operating
income
with
operating
margins
above
20
percent
over
the
lifetime
of
the
device.56
Kindle
owners
buy
three
to
four
times
more
books
than
they
did
prior
to
owning
the
device.57
And
Amazon
today
sells
more
electronic
books
overall
than
their
print
counterparts.58
In
terms
of
fueling
overall
sales,
SmartMoney
reported
that
Amazon
customers
who
don’t
own
a
Kindle
spend
an
average
of
$87
each
month,
while
those
with
a
Kindle
spend
$136,
and
Kindle
Fire
owners
spend
over
$150.59
As
device
and
storefront,
Amazon
has
begun
to
vertically
integrate,
capturing
several
segments
in
the
traditional
book
value
chain.
The
printed
book,
or
“dead-‐tree”
publication
value
chain
involved
a
publisher,
bookstore,
agent,
and
author.
Publishers
typically
get
half
of
a
physical
book’s
retail
price,
the
bookstore
takes
about
30
percent,
the
author
keeps
about
20
percent
as
a
royalty,
but
shares
15
to
20
percent
of
this
with
their
agent.
At
the
time
of
Kindle’s
rise,
six
large
publishers
controlled
about
60
percent
of
the
US
book
business
commonly
referred
to
as
‘trade
publishing’
(that
means
most
of
the
books
you’d
find
in
a
typical
bookstore,
but
not
titles
such
as
educational,
scientific,
and
medical
texts).60
While
most
Kindle
titles
are
from
publishers
that
sell
both
print
and
dead-‐tree
versions,
Amazon
has
gotten
into
the
publishing
business,
as
well
–
creating
several
of
its
own
‘imprints’
(publishing
divisions
that
specialize
in
a
genre,
like
foreign
translations,
romance,
or
sci-‐fi).
For
authors
wanting
to
bring
books
to
market
through
Amazon
instead
of
traditional
publishers,
Amazon
offers
royalty
options
ranging
from
35
to
70
percent.
There’s
even
a
“Kindle
Singles”
program
that
allows
authors
to
sell
work
too
short
for
a
stand-‐alone
book
(fiction,
essays,
magazine
articles).61
And
since
digitally
published
work
doesn’t
require
printing,
shipping,
and
shelf-‐stocking,
these
titles
can
often
come
to
market
far
faster
than
physical
offerings.
Using
Amazon
as
a
publisher
doesn’t
mean
your
titles
will
only
be
available
through
Kindle.62
The
firm
will
also
produce
print
books
and
even
offer
them
to
bookstores
willing
to
carry
the
titles.
But
Amazon
has
incented
many
authors
to
sell
exclusive
through
the
world’s
biggest
e-‐commerce
outlet
and
largest
eBook
platform.
By
March
2012,
Bezos
was
proclaiming
16
of
the
firm’s
top
100
bestselling
titles
were
“exclusive
to
our
store.”63
And
Amazon’s
digital
publishing
ambitions
aren’t
limited
to
the
printed
word.
The
firm’s
Amazon
Game
Studios
has
released
titles
for
Kindle
Fire
as
well
as
Android,
iOS,
and
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
19
Facebook.64
And
in
video,
Amazon
Studios
is
touted
by
Bezos
as
a
“completely
new
way
of
making
movies”
and
television
shows.65
The
firm
has
floated
several
feature
film
ideas
and
television
pilots
ranging
from
children’s
programming
to
adult
comedies
(many
featuring
well-‐known
actors),
with
the
promise
that
crowd
feedback
will
drive
what
makes
it
to
market.66
Channel
Conflict
Amazon’s
ambitions
to
be
a
publisher
that
also
sell
eReaders,
content,
and
just
about
everything
else,
put
it
at
odds
with
partners
who
also
increasingly
see
Amazon
as
a
rival.
Channel
conflict
exists
when
a
firm’s
potential
partners
see
that
firm
as
a
threat.
This
threat
could
come
because
it
offers
competing
products
or
services
via
alternative
channels,
or
because
the
firm
works
closely
with
especially
threatening
competitors.
Amazon
has
become
a
victim
of
channel
conflict
when
other
retailers
have
dropped
its
offerings.
For
example,
Barnes
and
Noble
and
other
book
retailers
have
refused
to
carry
titles
from
Amazon’s
publishing
arm.67
And
Walmart
and
Target
once
carried
the
Kindle
but
stopped,
fearing
Amazon’s
eReader
would
also
be
a
conduit
for
stealing
physical
sales,
as
well.68
Authors
and
firms
partnering
with
Amazon
can
also
suffer
channel
conflict.
When
Amazon
announced
a
partnership
with
DC
Comics
involving
exclusive
digital
rights
to
Superman
and
Batman
comics,
Barnes
and
Noble
and
other
book
retailers
pulled
DC
titles
from
their
shelves.69
The
winner
in
channel
conflict
is
the
firm
or
group
that
offers
greater
value
to
conflicted
partners.70
As
Amazon’s
scale
grows
to
a
seemingly
insurmountable
size
and
offers
additional
deal-‐sweeteners
like
better
author
royalty
rates,
authors
and
providers
of
other
goods
may
not
care
that
working
with
Amazon
will
cut
off
other
distribution
channels.
Those
fearing
that
Amazon
is
achieving
this
kind
of
scale
worry
that
the
firm
may
gain
near-‐monopoly
market
power.71
A
lawsuit
involving
Apple
and
Amazon
shows
the
uncertain
terrain
when
a
firm
with
feared
dominance
(Amazon)
comes
up
against
an
oligopoly
of
suppliers
seeking
to
balance
the
market
by
favoring
a
rival
(Apple).
Amazon’s
initial
pricing
agreement
with
many
eBook
publishers
was
what
is
often
referred
to
as
wholesale
pricing,
where
Amazon
paid
publishers
for
titles
and
then
sold
those
books
at
whatever
price
it
wished.
Jeff
Bezos
has
stated
traditional
trade
books
should
not
be
priced
more
than
ten
dollars72,
and
Amazon
offered
many
digital
titles
near
or
even
below
the
wholesale
price
in
order
to
fuel
the
market
for
Kindle
and
cement
its
own
dominant
standard.
When
Apple
introduced
the
iPad,
five
of
the
top
publishers
switched
from
wholesale
pricing
to
agency
pricing,
where
the
publisher
sets
the
price
and
the
reseller
gets
a
cut
(usually
around
30
percent).
Agency
pricing
isn’t
illegal,
but
rivals
colluding
to
set
prices
is.
A
lawsuit
contends
that
publishers
collectively
introduced
agency
pricing
to
the
iOS
bookstore,
and
shut
out
Amazon
unless
Bezos’s
firm
agreed
to
switch
to
agency
pricing,
too.73
Many
publishers
have
since
settled
the
case,
and
Amazon
has
regained
the
ability
to
offer
wholesale
pricing,
but
the
case
shows
challenging
issues
that
rise
as
network
effects,
switching
costs,
scale,
and
standards
in
the
digital
world
create
radical
power
shifts.
And
even
as
publishers
allow
Amazon
to
resume
wholesale
pricing,
Apple
still
has
weapons
to
wield
on
its
own
devices.
Apple
legally
charges
app
developers
30
percent
for
all
revenue
earned
through
in-‐app
purchases,
a
fee
that
would
further
crater
Amazon’s
thin-‐to-‐non-‐existent
margins
on
many
eBooks.
As
a
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
20
result,
Amazon
dropped
the
‘purchase’
button
from
iOS
Kindle
apps
(you
can
still
buy
eBooks
to
read
in
your
iOS
Kindle
app,
but
you’ve
got
to
exit
the
app
and
do
so
from
the
Web,
from
a
Kindle,
or
some
other
standard
that
Apple
doesn’t
control.
KEY
TAKEAWAYS:
• Over
1/3
of
Amazon
revenues
come
from
the
sale
of
media
businesses
that
are
rapidly
shifting
from
atoms
to
bits.
• Moore’s
Law
has
allowed
Amazon
to
radically
drop
the
price
of
Kindle
offerings,
while
increasing
device
functionality.
•
Amazon
does
not
make
money
by
selling
Kindle
hardware,
instead
it
seeks
to
fuel
media
and
e-‐commerce
sales,
plus
side-‐businesses
such
as
on-‐Kindle
and
in-‐app
advertising.
• The
dominance
of
the
platform
potentially
creates
several
advantages
including
network
effects
(more
Kindle
users
attract
more
Kindle-‐compatible
titles
and
products),
switching
costs,
and
user
data.
• Amazon
has
upended
the
publishing
value
chain
and
significantly
changed
the
cost-‐
structure
of
the
industry.
• Amazon
and
partners
have
also
been
victim
of
channel
conflict,
stopping
sale
of
Kindles
and
blocking
sale
of
books
published
through
Amazon
imprints.
But
when
channel
conflict
occurs,
the
winner
will
likely
be
the
channel
that
offers
the
greatest
aggregate
value
to
its
partners.
QUESTIONS
&
EXERCISES:
1. Roughly
how
big
is
Amazon’s
existing
‘media’
business?
What
is
happening
to
much
of
the
physical
media
business?
2. Both
Amazon
and
Apple
would
like
you
to
store
books,
music,
and
other
media
in
their
‘cloud’.
What
critical
key
strategic
advantage
comes
to
a
firm
when
consumers
adopting
one
firm’s
cloud
vs.
the
other?
3. Amazon
prices
Kindle
hardware
at
or
below
cost.
Conduct
research
to
find
out
Apple’s
margins
on
iPad
hardware.
How
does
Amazon
make
money
from
the
Kindle?
Which
firm
do
you
think
will
win
the
battle
for
tablet
computing?
Is
it
the
same
firm
you
think
will
win
the
battle
for
eReaders?
Do
you
think
there
be
one
winner?
Why
or
why
not?
4. Why
is
eInk
useful
in
an
eReader?
5. How
does
the
traditional
publishing
value
chain
differ
from
the
Kindle
value
chain
when
Amazon
is
an
author’s
publisher?
List
the
rough
percentages
of
revenue
taken
by
each
element
in
the
value
chain.
6. If
you
were
an
author,
would
you
use
Amazon
as
a
publisher
or
not?
What
factors
would
influence
this
decision?
What
do
you
think
will
happen
regarding
trends
and
these
factors
over
time?
7. How
is
Amazon
acting
as
a
hothouse
for
content
creation
beyond
books?
What
other
categories
of
media
products
is
Amazon
involved
in
developing?
Investigate
these
–
has
Amazon
done
well
or
have
these
products
been
flops?
Does
your
research
suggest
why
the
firm
has
had
success
or
has
struggled
in
various
categories?
8. What
is
channel
conflict
and
how
has
Amazon
been
subject
to
channel
conflict?
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
21
9. Is
Amazon
good
or
bad
for
the
book
business?
Explain
your
answer.
10. Consider
the
eBook
publishing
case
between
Amazon
and
Apple
and
research
the
current
state
of
the
market
and
any
court
rulings.
Is
Amazon
a
monopoly?
Does
Amazon
have
too
much
power
and
do
you
think
it
should
be
regulated?
Is
Amazon’s
pricing
‘predatory’
in
a
way
that
unfairly
disadvantages
would-‐be
competitors?
Should
Amazon
be
allowed
to
continue
agency
pricing
without
limitations?
Do
you
think
publishers
were
wrong
to
work
with
Apple?
What
is
the
current
status
of
this
case
(note:
similar
cases
in
the
US
and
Europe
may
be
at
differing
stages
or
have
differing
outcomes)?
Come
to
class
prepared
to
discuss
your
opinions
and
your
findings.
AMAZON
&
THE
CLOUD:
FROM
PERSONAL
STORAGE
TO
AWS
LEARNING
OBJECTIVES:
After
studying
this
section
you
should
be
able
to:
• Identify
several
of
Amazon’s
personal
cloud
offerings,
how
they
are
used,
and
the
value
they
provide
both
users
and
Amazon.
• Understand
Amazon’s
cloud
computing
offerings,
the
services
provided,
the
firms
that
use
AWS,
the
size
of
this
business,
and
the
firm’s
vision
for
its
future
growth.
• Recognize
why
firms
use
cloud
computing
platforms,
and
some
of
the
risks
associated
with
giving
up
control
of
certain
infrastructure.
Amazon’s
shift
from
selling
media
atoms
to
selling
media
bits
has
led
to
its
expansion
into
consumer
cloud-‐based
offerings
that
store
and
serve
up
digital
content
over
the
Internet.
It’s
already
been
pointed
out
that
the
Kindle
stores
some
purchased
content
off-‐device
and
can
load
a
customer’s
‘virtual
bookshelf’
on
demand,
even
if
you
delete
purchases
from
your
device.
Same
thing
with
Kindle
Fire
apps.
Amazon
Cloud
Drive
offers
file
storage
similar
to
Dropbox
and
Google
Drive.
And
Amazon
Cloud
Player
will
stream
music
purchases
through
a
web
browser
or
smartphone
app.
Amazon
has
even
negotiated
rights
with
major
labels,
retroactively
loading
digital
copies
of
a
customer’s
CD
and
even
vinyl
record
purchases
into
a
customer’s
Cloud
Player
account.74
But
Amazon’s
biggest
cloud
push
comes
in
offering
access
to
corporate-‐quality
computing
as
a
service.
AWS,
or
Amazon
Web
Services,
allows
firms,
and
really
anyone
with
a
credit
card,
to
rent
industrial-‐strength
computing
capacity
on
an
as-‐needed
basis.
The
best-‐known
offerings
are
Amazon’s
EC2
(Elastic
Computing
Cloud),
which
provides
the
virtual
equivalent
of
physical
computing
hardware;
and
S3
(Simple
Storage
Service)
providing
Web-‐based
storage.
But
AWS
provides
dozens
of
service
offerings
including
various
operating
systems,
database
products,
enterprise
software,
programming
environments,
networking
services,
and
more.
For
years,
big
server
firms
like
IBM,
HP,
and
Sun
worked
at
creating
a
market
for
so-‐called
“utility
computing”,
a
rent-‐not-‐buy
model
where
consumers
paid
for
technology
as-‐needed,
similar
to
how
one
pays
for
water
or
electricity.
But
in
true
disruptive
form,
it
wasn’t
enterprise-‐class
hardware
firms,
but
a
company
originally
launched
as
an
online
bookstore
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
22
that
managed
to
get
real
traction
in
this
market.
Today
AWS
powers
hundreds
of
businesses,
including
Etsy,
Airbnb,
Pinterest,
Yelp,
and
Zynga.
It’s
Amazon’s
services
that
allowed
thirteen
guys
to
scale
Instagram
to
tens
of
millions
of
users
and
a
billion
dollar
acquisition
price
in
just
fifteen
months.
And
firms
that
might
consider
Amazon
as
a
rival,
including
Netflix
and
Dropbox,
rely
on
AWS,
as
well.
What’s
notable
is
that
many
of
these
firm’s
aren’t
just
big
firms,
they’re
the
largest
firms
in
their
categories.75
NASA,
Eli
Lilly,
the
New
York
Times
Corporation,
and
ESPN
have
all
used
AWS
for
key
tasks,
too.
Advantages
of
using
the
cloud
are
outlined
in
the
chapter
“Software
in
Flux,”
but
include
allowing
organizations
to
rent
server
capacity
as
needed
–
scaling
up
during
high
demand
periods
or
intensive
but
short-‐term
projects,
without
having
to
over-‐invest
in
hardware,
software,
and
personnel.
And
Amazon’s
deep
experience
in
scalability,
security,
and
fault-‐tolerance
are
usually
far
better
than
a
smaller
firm
could
develop
on
its
own.
AWS
isn’t
fool-‐proof.
Well
known
outages
have
temporarily
taken
down
or
dramatically
slowed
several
sites
that
have
used
the
service,
but
most
don’t
feel
they
could
do
a
better
job
at
a
better
price,
even
if
this
means
relying
on
another
firm
to
provide
vital
resources.
Target
provides
a
cautionary
tale
–
the
discount
retailer
had
been
relying
on
Amazon
to
power
its
website,
but
left
in
an
effort
to
create
its
own
infrastructure.
Three
weeks
later
an
unexpectedly
popular
Target
promotion
crashed
the
firm’s
website.76
AWS
was
introduced
in
2006,
although
some
offerings
were
available
as
early
as
2002.
Google’s
competing
AppEngine
wasn’t
offered
until
2008,
and
Microsoft’s
Windows
Azure
cloud
platform
came
out
in
2010.
There
are
advantages
to
moving
early
as
a
platform
provider.
An
early
lead
with
a
market-‐serving
product
creates
a
big
share,
customer
lock-‐
in,
internal
learning,
and
a
network
effect
derived
from
complementary
offerings
ranging
from
the
employment
base
provided
by
a
growing
number
of
AWS-‐skilled
developers
to
a
rich
assortment
of
software
capable
of
using
the
platform.
Even
server
providers
like
Rackspace
and
HP
are
playing
catch
up
with
Amazon.77
AWS
is
just
a
single-‐digit
percentage
of
Amazon’s
overall
revenue,
but
it
is
already
a
multi-‐
billion
revenue-‐generator
and
the
firm’s
fastest-‐growing
business.78
Bezos
has
stated
that
he
thinks
AWS
can
eventually
become
as
big
as
Amazon’s
retail
business.79
Why
did
Amazon
decide
to
get
into
this
business
in
the
first
place?
Some
have
suggested
that
AWS
came
out
of
Amazon’s
desire
to
make
money
from
the
firm’s
excess
computing
capacity,
but
the
firm’s
CTO
has
debunked
that
as
a
myth
and
misconception.
The
real
goal
of
AWS
was
to
monetize
the
firm’s
expertise
in
scalability
and
reliability
and
turn
this
into
a
revenue-‐
generating
business.
The
benefits
of
having
an
entire
skilled
division
of
technicians
creating
reliable,
standard
platforms
that
Amazon
can
then
use
itself
(instead
of
buying
these
services
from
others)
is
also
seen
as
a
key
benefit.80
Building
this
capacity
doesn’t
come
cheap.
AWS
accounted
for
the
majority
of
the
$1.6
billion
increase
in
technology
and
content
spending
that
the
firm
reported
in
2012.81
But
long-‐term
Bezos
sees
the
future
unfolding,
and
he
wants
to
rake-‐in
billions
more
not
only
by
selling
you
just
about
everything
you
need,
but
also
by
powering
any
organization
that
is
willing
to
farm
out
computing
to
the
cloud.
KEY
TAKEAWAYS:
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
23
• Amazon
offers
personal
cloud
storage
options
for
all
forms
of
media,
including
books,
games,
music,
and
video.
It
even
offers
file
storage
akin
to
Dropbox
and
Google
Drive.
These
personal
cloud
offerings
allow
users
to
access
files
from
any
app,
browser
or
device
with
appropriate
access.
• Amazon
Web
Services
(AWS)
allows
anyone
with
a
credit
card
to
access
industrial-‐
strength,
scalable
computing
resources.
Services
include
computing
capability,
storage,
and
many
operating
systems,
software
development
platforms,
and
enterprise-‐class
applications.
• Firms
using
cloud
providers
lose
control
of
certain
aspects
of
their
infrastructure,
and
an
error
or
crash
caused
by
the
cloud
provider
could
shut-‐off
or
scale-‐back
vital
service
availability.
Amazon
and
other
vendors
have
experienced
outages
that
have
negatively
impacted
clients.
Despite
these
challenges,
most
firms
believe
they
lack
resources
and
scale
to
do
a
higher-‐quality
or
more
cost-‐effective
job
than
specialized
cloud
providers.
• AWS
and
compoeting
cloud
services
offer
several
advantages,
including
increased
scalability,
reliability,
security,
lower
labor
costs,
lower
hardware
costs,
and
the
ability
to
shift
computing
from
large
fixed-‐cost
investments
to
variable
costs.
Since
Amazon
also
uses
products
developed
by
AWS,
the
firm’s
e-‐commerce
and
Kindle
operations
also
benefit
from
the
effort.
• Bezos
believes
that
Amazon’s
AWS
business
can
be
at
least
as
big
as
the
firm’s
e-‐
commerce
efforts.
QUESTIONS
&
EXERCISES:
1. What
other
personal
cloud
products
exist
for
vendors
beyond
Amazon.
2. Do
you
use
personal
cloud
services?
Do
you
use
Amazon
products
or
products
provided
by
rivals?
Why
have
you
made
the
choices
you
have
regarding
cloud
platforms?
3. What
is
AWS
and
what
services
are
provided?
Investigate
online
and
report
back
on
the
costs
associated
with
key
services
such
as
EC2
and
S3.
4. Which
firms
use
AWS?
What
do
they
gain
by
using
a
cloud
provider
and
what
do
they
give
up?
How
might
Amazon
or
other
cloud
firms
reduce
concerns
potential
and
existing
clients
might
have?
5. If
there
are
alternatives
available,
why
would
firms
that
compete
with
Amazon
in
some
businesses
use
Amazon
anyway?
6. Are
network
effects
at
work
in
cloud
platforms?
How
so?
What
kinds
of
complementary
products
might
make
AWS
seem
more
attractive
than
a
new
cloud
computing
effort?
7. How
big
is
this
business
compared
to
Amazon’s
other
divisions?
How
big
does
Amazon
think
it
can
get?
8. Why
did
Amazon
decide
to
get
into
cloud
computing?
This
business
is
radically
different
from
shipping
books
and
other
physical
products,
do
you
think
Amazon
should
continue
to
keep
AWS
as
part
of
Amazon.com,
or
should
it
spin
the
firm
out
as
a
separate
company?
What
would
be
the
advantages
to
either
approach?
Search
online
to
see
if
you
can
find
opinions
that
analysts
or
journalists
may
have
regarding
AWS’s
growth
prospects
in
Amazon
or
as
a
separate
firm,
and
be
prepared
to
report
your
findings
back
to
class.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
24
•
•
•
•
•
About
This
Work
This
content
is
provided
as
a
draft-‐for-‐comment
and
will
appear
in
a
revised
form
in
the
Summer
2013
update
of
the
award-‐winning
textbook
“Information
Systems:
A
Manager’s
Guide
to
Harnessing
Technology,”
published
by
Flat
World
Knowledge
(www.flatworldknowledge.com).
The
text
is
available
online,
in
browser-‐readable
and
other
formats,
starting
at
only
$19.95.
That’s
less
than
1/10th
the
price
of
competing
textbooks
and
significantly
less
than
what
many
students
pay
for
course
packets
or
textbook
rental.
The
textbook
has
been
adopted
by
over
200
universities,
including
6
of
the
top
10
undergraduate
IS
programs
as
ranked
by
US
News
and
World
Report.
I
hope
that
you
like
the
content
and
adopt
the
book
in
your
classes.
Flat
World
Knowledge
is
on
an
important
mission
providing
high-‐quality,
low-‐cost
textbooks,
and
I
fully
support
this
goal.
If
you’re
a
student,
share
with
your
professor
and
have
them
contact
Flat
World
for
more
information.
Please
tell
others,
and
thanks!
Comments
&
feedback
are
most
welcome!
Contact
Info:
• E-‐Mail:
[email protected]
• Additional
Content,
Cases,
Slides,
and
Podcasts:
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
• For
updates,
supporting
articles,
and
commentary,
sign
up
for
the
Week
in
Geek
at:
http://www.gallaugher.com
• And
I
am
quite
active
on
Twitter,
regularly
sharing
articles
and
other
content
that
may
be
useful
for
faculty
&
students.
Feel
free
to
follow
at
Tweets by gallaugher
About
the
Author
John
Gallaugher
is
a
member
of
the
Dept.
of
Information
Systems
in
Boston
College’s
Carroll
School
of
Management.
As
founding
faculty
of
the
Boston
College
TechTrek
programs,
Professor
Gallaugher
brings
students
to
engage
in
master-‐class
sessions
with
dozens
of
CEOs,
senior
managers,
entrepreneurs,
and
venture
capitalists
in
Silicon
Valley,
San
Francisco,
Seattle,
Boston,
New
York,
and
Ghana.
Participating
organizations
range
from
Apple
to
Zynga,
as
well
as
some
of
the
world’s
most
promising
startups
and
leading
venture
capital
firms.
Professor
Gallaugher
is
also
faculty
advisor
to
the
Boston
College
Venture
Competition,
a
program
that
has
developed
entrepreneurs
that
have
gone
on
to
elite
accelerator
programs
(Y-‐Combinator,
TechStars,
[email protected],
MassChallenge),
launched
multiple
products,
and
raised
millions
in
capital.
Professor
Gallaugher’s
academic
writing
has
been
published
in
the
Harvard
Business
Review,
MIS
Quarterly,
and
other
leading
outlets,
and
he
is
the
author
of
the
award-‐winning
textbook
“Information
Systems:
A
Manager’s
Guide
to
Harnessing
Technology”
(flatworldknowledge.com).
He
has
consulted
to
and
taught
executive
seminars
for
several
organizations
including
Accenture,
Alcoa,
Brattle
Group,
Duke
Executive
Education,
ING
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
25
Group,
and
the
University
of
Ulster.
His
comments
on
business
and
technology
have
appeared
in
many
outlets
including
The
New
York
Times,
National
Public
Radio,
Wired,
The
Boston
Globe,
WCVB-‐TV,
the
Associated
Press,
The
Daily
Yomiuri
(Japan)
and
The
Nation
(Thailand).
He’s
actually
not
as
stuffy
as
this
profile
sounds,
but
he
does
hope
that
you
read
the
rest
of
his
book
and,
if
you’re
a
professor,
that
you
adopt
the
textbook
for
your
class.
He
loves
hearing
from
readers
via
Twitter
(@gallaugher),
e-‐mail,
and
Google
Plus.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
26
DEFINITIONS:
Account
payable
–
money
owed
for
products
and
services
purchased
on
credit.
Cash
Conversion
Cycle
–
period
between
distributing
cash,
and
collecting
funds
associated
with
a
given
operation
(e.g.
sales).
Dynamic
pricing
–
pricing
that
shifts
over
time,
usually
based
on
conditions
that
change
demand
(e.g.
charging
more
for
scarce
items).
Liquidity
Problems
–
arise
when
organizations
cannot
easily
convert
assets
to
cash.
Cash
is
considered
the
most
liquid
asset,
that
is
it
is
widely
accepted
with
a
value
understood
by
all.
Inventory
Turns
–
the
number
of
times
inventory
is
sold
or
used
during
a
specific
period
(such
as
a
year
or
quarter).
A
higher
figure
means
a
firm
is
selling
products
quickly.
A/B
testing-‐
a
randomized
group
of
experiments
used
to
collect
data
and
compare
performance
among
two
options
studied
(A
and
B).
A/B
testing
is
often
used
in
refining
the
design
of
technology
products,
and
A/B
tests
are
particularly
easy
to
run
over
the
Internet
on
a
firm’s
website.
Amazon,
Google,
and
Facebook
are
among
the
firms
that
aggressively
leverage
hundreds
of
A/B
tests
a
year
in
order
to
improve
their
product
offerings.
Cookie
–
a
line
of
identifying
text,
assigned
and
retrieved
by
a
given
web
server,
and
stored
by
your
browser.
Collaborative
filtering-‐
a
classification
of
software
that
monitors
trends
among
customer
and
uses
this
data
to
personalize
an
individual
customer’s
experience.
Two-‐sided
network
effect-‐
products
or
services
that
get
more
valuable
as
two
distinct
categories
of
participant
expand
(e.g.
buyers
and
sellers).
Affiliate
program
–
marketing
practice
where
a
firm
rewards
partners
(affiliates)
who
bring
in
new
business,
often
with
a
percentage
of
any
resulting
sales.
Channel
conflict
exists
when
a
firm’s
potential
partners
see
that
firm
as
a
threat.
This
threat
could
come
because
it
offers
competing
products
or
services
via
alternative
channels,
or
because
the
firm
works
closely
with
especially
threatening
competitors.
Flash-‐sales
–
offering
deep
discounts
of
a
limited
quantity
of
inventory.
Flash
sales
often
run
for
a
fixed
period
or
until
inventory
is
completely
depleted.
Players
include
Guilt
Groupe
and
Amazon’s
MyHabit
in
fashion,
and
OneKingsLane
in
home
décor,
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
27
REFERENCES
1
A.,
Deuthschman,
“Inside
the
Mind
of
Jeff
Bezos,”
FastCompany,
Aug.
1,
2004.
2
K.
Brooker,
“Back
to
being
Amazon.bomb,”
Fortune,
June
26,
2000.
J.
Martinson,
“Amazon.bomb:
How
the
internet’s
biggest
success
story
turned
sour,”
The
Guardian,
June
26,
2000.
L.
Dignan,
“What
a
difference
a
decade
makes:
Barron’s
Proclaims
Amazon
best
retailer,”
ZDNet,
March
28,
2009.
D.
Alef,
Jeff
Bezos
and
the
eBook
Revolution,
Titans
of
Fortune
Publishing,
Feb.
2011.
3
A.
Lashinsky,
“Amazon’s
Jeff
Bezos:
The
Ultimate
Disrupter,”
Fortune,
Nov.
16,
2012.
4
J.
Yarrow,
“Chart
of
the
Day:
Amazon
Has
the
Best
Reputation
of
Any
Company
in
the
U.S.”
BusinessInsider,
Feb.
12,
2013.
5
T.
Carmody,
“Surprise!
Jeff
Bezos
Explains
to
Amazon
Investors
Why
No
Profits
are
a
Good
Thing,”
The
Verge,
April
12,
2013.
6
S.
Levy,
“Jeff
Bezos
Owns
the
Web
in
More
Ways
Than
You
Think,”
Wired,
Dec.
2011.
7
S.
Woo,
“What
Makes
Bezos
Tick?
A
$42
Million
Clock,
for
Starters,”
Wall
Street
Journal,
June
19,
2012.
8
D.
Carvajal,
“The
Other
Battle
Over
Browsers;
Barnes
&
Noble
and
Other
On-‐Line
Booksellers
Are
Poised
to
Challenge
Amazon.com,”
The
New
York
Times,
March
9,
1998.
R.
Brandt,
“Birth
of
a
Salesman,”
The
Wall
Street
Journal,
Oct.
15,
2011.
9
J.P.
Mangalindan,
“What
Wall
Street
Really
Thinks
of
Amazon,”
Fortune,
December
19,
2012
10
R.
Hof,
“Jeff
Bezos:
How
Amazon
Web
Services
is
Just
Like
the
Kindle
Business,”
Forbes,
Nov.
29,
2012.
11
F.
Vogelstein,
“Mighty
Amazon
Jeff
Bezos
has
been
hailed
as
a
visionary
and
put
down
as
a
goofball.
He’s
proved
critics
wrong
by
forging
a
winning
management
strategy
built
on
brains,
guts,
and
above
all,
numbers.”
Fortune,
May
26,
2003.
12
G.
Marino,
“Geeking
Out
at
Amazon,”
Technology
Review,
Oct.
15,
2007.
13
F.
Vogelstein,
“Mighty
Amazon
Jeff
Bezos
has
been
hailed
as
a
visionary
and
put
down
as
a
goofball.
He’s
proved
critics
wrong
by
forging
a
winning
management
strategy
built
on
brains,
guts,
and
above
all,
numbers.”
Fortune,
May
26,
2003.
14
J.
Salter,
“Behind
the
Scenes
at
Amazon’s
Christmas
Warehouse,”
The
Telegraph,
Nov.
13,
2012.
15
H.
Hal
Bernton
and
S.
Kelleher,
“Amazon
warehouse
jobs
push
workers
to
physical
limit,”
Seattle
Times,
April
5,
2012.
16
J.
Salter,
“Behind
the
Scenes
at
Amazon’s
Christmas
Warehouse,”
The
Telegraph,
Nov.
13,
2012.
17
J.
Salter,
“Behind
the
Scenes
at
Amazon’s
Christmas
Warehouse,”
The
Telegraph,
Nov.
13,
2012.
18
H.
Hal
Bernton
and
S.
Kelleher,
“Amazon
warehouse
jobs
push
workers
to
physical
limit,”
Seattle
Times,
April
5,
2012.
19
H.
Hal
Bernton
and
S.
Kelleher,
“Amazon
warehouse
jobs
push
workers
to
physical
limit,”
Seattle
Times,
April
5,
2012.
20
J.
Salter,
“Behind
the
Scenes
at
Amazon’s
Christmas
Warehouse,”
The
Telegraph,
Nov.
13,
2012.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
28
21
J.
Salter,
“Behind
the
Scenes
at
Amazon’s
Christmas
Warehouse,”
The
Telegraph,
Nov.
13,
2012.
22
H.
Hal
Bernton
and
S.
Kelleher,
“Amazon
warehouse
jobs
push
workers
to
physical
limit,”
Seattle
Times,
April
5,
2012.
23
J.
Salter,
“Behind
the
Scenes
at
Amazon’s
Christmas
Warehouse,”
The
Telegraph,
Nov.
13,
2012.
24
H.
Hal
Bernton
and
S.
Kelleher,
“Amazon
warehouse
jobs
push
workers
to
physical
limit,”
Seattle
Times,
April
5,
2012.
25
C.
Loomis,
Amazon’s
Invisible
Innovations,
Fortune,
Nov.
11,
2004.
26
S.
Distinguin,
Amazon.com:
the
Hidden
Empire
(2013
Update),
faberNovel,
Feb.
2013.
27
“The
Cash
Conversion
Cycle,”
Forbes,
March
10,
2012.
(no
author
listed)
28
From
Walmart
Unit
Count
&
Square
Footage,
Feb.
18,
2013
-‐
http://stock.walmart.com/financial-‐reporting/unit-‐counts-‐square-‐footage
29
Target
Corporate
Fact
Sheet,
Feb.
18,
2013
-‐
http://pressroom.target.com/corporate
30
Eugene
Wei,
“Amazon,
Apple
and
the
Beauty
of
Lower
Margins,”
The
Remains
of
the
Day,
Nov.
28,
2012.
31
Jannarone,
John,
“Retailers
Struggle
in
Amazon’s
Jungle”,
Wall
Street
Journal,
Feb.
22,
2011.
Note:
study
assumed
no
sales
tax
and
free
shipping
on
Amazon,
common
for
purchases
totaling
$25
or
more.
The
savings
vs.
Walmart
were
cut
in
half
for
purchases
requiring
standard
shipping.
32
D.
Streitfeld,
“Amazon
Flunks
Pricing
Test
/
Sliding
Cost
Angers
Shoppers,”
Washington
Post,
Sept.
28,
2000.
33
Adapted
from
data
in:
Jannarone,
John,
“Retailers
Struggle
in
Amazon’s
Jungle”,
Wall
Street
Journal,
Feb.
22,
2011
and
S.
Distinguin,
Amazon.com:
the
Hidden
Empire
(2013
Update),
34
D.
Frommer,
“10
Amazon
Private-‐label
Products
You
Didn’t
Know
Existed,”
BusinessInsider,
Nov.
19,
2009.
35
BusinessInsider,
The
Billionaires’
Club:
Only
36
Companies
Have
$1,000
Million-‐Plus
Ad
Budgets,”
Nov.
11,
2012.
36
G.
Anders,
“Inside
Amazon’s
Idea
Machine:
How
Bezos
Decodes
the
Customer,”
Forbes,
April
4,
2012.
37
A.
Elliott,
“Amazon.com
Facts:
10
Things
You
Didn’t
Know
About
the
Web’s
Biggest
Retailer,”
Mashable,
June
22,
2011.
38
S.
Distinguin,
Amazon.com:
the
Hidden
Empire
(2013
Update),
faberNovel,
Feb.
2013.
39
B.
Christian,
“The
A/B
Test:
Inside
the
Technology
That’s
Changing
the
Rules
of
Business,”
Wired,
April
25,
2012.
40
M.
Wessel,
“How
Big
Companies
Should
Innovate,”
Harvard
Business
Review
Blog
Network,
Oct.
1,
2012.
41
R.
Brandt,
“Birth
of
a
Salesman,”
The
Wall
Street
Journal,
Oct.
15,
2011.
42
B.
Eisenberg,
“Hidden
Secrets
of
the
Amazon
Shopping
Cart,”
FutureNow,
Feb.
26,
2008.
43
J.
Salter,
“Behind
the
Scenes
at
Amazon’s
Christmas
Warehouse,”
The
Telegraph,
Nov.
13,
2012.
44
M. Learmonth, “Amzon: The Quietest Big Ad Business in Tech Would Like Your Brand Ads,
Too,” AdAage, April 11, 2013.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
29
45
I.
Steiner,
“Amazon
Sellers
Achieve
40
Percent
Unit
Growth
in
Q4
2012,”
eCommerce
Bytes,
Jan.
30,
2013.
46
T.
Duryee,
“Eight
Percent
of
Amazon’s
Sales
are
Coming
from
Mobile,”
AllThingsD,
Jan.
4,
2013
–
note
despite
the
title,
the
article
quotes
analysts
suggesting
figure
may
be
10
percent
or
higher.
47
S.
Lacy,
“Mobile
Revenues
Surging
for
Companies
Like
One
Kings
Lane
While
Traditional
E-‐Commerce
Remains
Clueless,”
Pando
Daily,
Aug.
30,
2012.
48
A.
Hines,
“Amazon’s
Quidsi
Lures
Shoppers
Online
to
Buy
the
Basics
from
Diapers
to
Pet
Food,”
Huffington
Post,
Sept.
28,
2012.
49
S.
Lacy,
“Amazon
Buys
Zappos,
The
Price
is
$928
million,
not
$847
million,”
TechCrunch,
July
22,
2009.
50
F.
Manjoo,
“I
Want
It
Today,”
Slate,
July
11,
2012.
51
C.
Henage,
“3
Lies
Being
Told
to
Amazon
Investors,”
Motley
Fool,
Oct.
21,
2012.
52
J.
Leber,
“Amazon
Woos
Advertisers
with
What
It
Knows
about
Consumers,”
Technology
Review,
Jan.
21,
2013.
53
S.
Levy,
“Jeff
Bezos
Owns
the
Web
in
More
Ways
Than
You
Think,”
Wired,
Dec.
2011.
54
J.
Herman,
“Kindle
Outsells
Every
Other
Product
on
Amazon
(and
What
That
Really
Means),”
Gizmodo,
Nov.
30,
2009.
55
J.
Yarow,
“Amazon
is
Not
Doing
a
$99
Table,
Despite
Rumors,”
Business
Insider,
March
20,
2013.
56
J.
Paczkowski,
“Amazon
Makes
More
than
$100
Off
Each
Kindle
Fire,”
AllThingsD,
Jan.
19,
2012.
57
K.
Auletta,
“Publish
or
Perish,”
The
New
Yorker,
April
20,
2010.
And
BBC
News,
“Amazon
Selling
More
Kindle
ebooks
than
Print
Books,”
Aug.
8,
2012.
S.
Malik,
“Kindle
Ebook
Sales
Have
Overtaken
Amazon
Print
Sales,
Says
Book
Seller,”
The
Guardian,
Aug.
5,
2012.
58
BBC
News,
“Amazon
Selling
More
Kindle
ebooks
than
Print
Books,”
Aug.
8,
2012.
59
Q.
Forttrell,
“10
Things
That
Amazon
Won’t
Tell
You,”
SmartMoney,
June
26,
2012.
60
A.
Losowsky,
“DRM
Lawsuit
Filed
by
Independent
Bookstores
Against
Amazon,
‘Big
Six’
Publishers,”
The
Huffington
Post,
Feb.
20,
2013.
61
F.
Manjoo,
“Don’t
Support
Your
Local
Bookseller,”
Slate,
Dec.
13,
2011.
62
B.
Stone,
“Amazon’s
Hit
Man,”
BusinessWeek,
Jan.
25,
2012.
63
B.
Stone,
“Why
the
Amazon
Naysayers
Should
Be
Scared,”
BusinessWeek,
April
27,
2012.
64
D.
Melanson,
“Amazon
Game
Studios
Releases
its
first
Mobile
Game,
Air
Patriots,
for
iOS,
Android,
and
Kindle
Fire,”
Engadget,
Nov.
1,
2012.
65
S.
Levy,
“Jeff
Bezos
Owns
the
Web
in
More
Ways
Than
You
Think,”
Wired,
Dec.
2011.
66
J.
Mitchell,
“Amazon
Studios
Unveils
14
Pilots
Online,
Wants
User
Feedback
To
Determine
Which
Go
to
Series,”
Entertainment
Weekly,
April
19,
2013.
67
N.
Krug,
“Amazon
Finds
its
Books
Aren’t
Welcome
at
Many
Bookstores,”
The
Washington
Post,
Oct.
30,
2012.
68
L.
Hazard
Owen,
“Following
Target,
Walmart
Stops
Selling
Kindles,”
GigaOm,
Sept.
20,
2012.
69
Streitfeld,
David
(October
18,
2011).
“Bookstores
Drop
Comics
After
Amazon
Deal
With
DC”.
The
New
York
Times.
Gallaugher
–
Information
Security
–
http://gallaugher.com/chapters
p.
30
70
J.
Gallaugher,
“E-‐Commerce
and
the
Undulating
Distribution
Channel,”
Communications
of
the
ACM,
Vol.
45,
No.
7,
July
2002.
71
B.
Gladstone,
“Is
Amazon
a
New
Monopoly?”
NPR’s
On
the
Media,
April
20,
2012.
72
S.
Levy,
“Jeff
Bezos
Owns
the
Internet
in
More
Ways
than
You
Think,”
Wired,
Nov.
13,
2011.
73
I.
Luden,
“Penguin
Settles
with
the
EU
on
Apple
E-‐Book
Pricing
Case
to
‘Clear
the
Decks’
for
Random
House
Merger,”
TechCrunch,
April
19,
2013.
B.
Proffitt,
“eBook
Settlement
Big
Win
for
Amazon
&
Consumers,”
ReadWrite,
Sept.
7,
2012.
74
C.
Warren,
“Amazon
Will
Give
you
Free
MP3s
of
Your
Vinyl
Record
Purchases,”
Mashable,
April
3,
2013.
75
R.
McMillan,
“Why
Amazon
Hired
a
Car
Mechanic
to
Run
its
Cloud
Empire,”
Wired,
Feb.
19,
2013.
76
S.
Clifford,
“Demand
at
Target
for
Fashion
Line
Crashes
Site,”
The
New
York
Times,
Sept.
13,
2011.
77
S.
Levy,
“Jeff
Bezos
Owns
the
Web
in
More
Ways
Than
You
Think,”
Wired,
Dec.
2011.
78
R.
Hof,
“Jeff
Bezos:
How
Amazon
Web
Services
is
Just
Like
the
Kindle
Business,”
Forbes,
Nov.
29,
2012.
79
Deloitte,
Scaling
the
Edges:
Amazon
Case
Study,
accessed
April
24,
2013
via
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Industries/technology/e801d11accab9310Vgn
VCM2000001b56f00aRCRD.htm
80
A.
Hesseldahl,
“Should
Amazon
Spin
Out
Its
Cloud
Services?”
AllThingsD,
Feb.
11,
2013.
81
R.
McMillan,
“Why
Amazon
Hired
a
Car
Mechanic
to
Run
its
Cloud
Empire,”
Wired,
Feb.
19,
2013.
2
page
double-
spaced
paper
(no need to follow any writing format such as MLA or APA) addressing the following questions:
1. What are some of the advantages in having a longer time horizon? What are some of the challenges? What needs to happen to enable Amazon to continue to ‘think long term’? What could derail this approach?
2. Does Amazon buy most of its warehouse automation software from others or is most of the software written in-house? Why do you suppose this is the case?
3. Describe how Amazon Marketplace offers two-sided network effects. Besides network effects, what additional benefits does Amazon gain by allowing other retailers to sell potentially competing products on Amazon?
4. Both Amazon and Apple would like you to store books, music, and other media in their ‘cloud’. What critical key strategic advantage comes to a firm when consumers adopting one firm’s cloud vs. the other?
5. Which firms use AWS? What do they gain by using a cloud provider and what do they give up? How might Amazon or other cloud firms reduce concerns potential and existing clients might have?
6. Are network effects at work in cloud platforms? How so? What kinds of complementary products might make AWS seem more attractive than a new cloud computing effort?
7. Why did Amazon decide to get into cloud computing? This business is radically different from shipping books and other physical products, do you think Amazon should continue to keep AWS as part of Amazon.com, or should it spin the firm out as a separate company? What would be the advantages to either approach? Search online to see if you can find opinions that analysts or journalists may have regarding AWS’s growth prospects in Amazon or as a separate firm. (2.5 points)
Write in a word document and submit to canvas. Organize in the respective questions for easier grading and higher points.
Needs help with similar assignment?
We are available 24x7 to deliver the best services and assignment ready within 3-12 hours? PAY FOR YOUR FIRST ORDER AFTER COMPLETION..

